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Abstract 
Income-generating projects are used as a tool of engendered development in developing economies. This 
paper uses primary data from rural Morocco to investigate whether income-generating projects have an 
impact on the five dimensions of women’s empowerment identified: economic decision-making, child 
decision-making, mobility, access to resources, and control over resources. The paper uses Instrumental 
Variable (IV) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods to address the endogeneity and selection on 
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significant increase in total empowerment respectively.  
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I. Motivation  
Women’s empowerment is increasingly perceived as one of the key elements in poverty reduction strategies 
and attempts across the world. Empowerment allows individuals to reach their full potential, and to allow 
them to reach their own capabilities. Gender empowerment has significant implications for the rest of the 
household. Empirically, empowered women appear to have fewer children and higher child survival rates 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; Dyson and Moore, 1983), healthier and better-fed children (Lundberg, 
Pollak and Wales, 1997; Kanbur and Haddad, 1994), and a generally greater allocation of resources to 
children (Thomas, 1990). Theoretically, the question of women’s empowerment has consistently 
experienced a tension between structure and agency. It is difficult to capture women’s empowerment within 
a generation because it is driven by not only informational efficiency about the range of choices that a 
woman has, but also about what Kabeer (1994) has defined as the “power within.” This is a woman’s 
intrinsic belief in her ability to control resources and to make decisions.  
The World Bank sees women’s empowerment as a means of promoting growth, reducing poverty, and 
promoting better governance – in addition to being an objective within itself. In 1994, the International 
Conference on Population and Development identified “women’s empowerment and gender equity” as 
factors that are critical to sustainable development. We continue to refine our definitions and answers, but 
the same question remains, even 10 years later – what empowers women? And how does their 
empowerment manifest itself?  
There is no shortage of development programs with the explicit goal of gender empowerment. 
Development programs attempt to empower women by increasing their access to credit, contraceptives and 
education. Microfinance, as an institution, has often attempted to address the structures that inhibit 
engendered development. The effectiveness of microfinance programs continues to be debated, as many 
evaluations do not provide conclusive results. Female targeting could be a cost-effective strategy for 
microfinance institutions, and also effective in its ability to address poverty. However, this requires that 
adequate support networks and empowerment strategies are able to diffuse the complete burden of 
household debt and subsistence onto women.  
In order to overcome the limitations associated with microfinance, instead, I explore the role that income-
generating projects – economically sustainable activities – have on the empowerment of women in rural 
Morocco. This moves away from capturing what could be debt dependency and disempowerment. I use 
primary data from rural Morocco to examine the impact of income-generating projects supported by non-
profit associations working on female empowerment outcomes. The income-generating projects aim to 
empower women by economically uplifting the women. I measure empowerment using (i) economic 
decision-making, (ii) child decision-making, (iii) mobility, (iv) access to resources, and (v) control over 
resources. These variables represent a variety of dimensions in which engaging with income-generating 
projects can empower women domestically, socially, and of course, economically.  
I investigate this question through a quasi-experimental, observational framework. In doing so, I address 
some sources of bias that may arise. I anticipate selection on observable and endogeneity of treatment (the 
woman’s choice of whether to engage in an income-generating project). Using instrumental variables and 
propensity score matching, I compare pre-determined levels of empowerment and empowerment outcomes, 
to establish that even after controlling for the pre-determined level of empowerment, income-generating 
projects have an impact on the dimensions of empowerment considered. Some of the questions I attempt to 
address include, but are not limited, to the following: 
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1. What is the impact of income-generating projects on women’s empowerment in rural Morocco? 
2. Is this impact uniform across all the domains of household decisions? 
3. Can a relationship of causality be established? 
 
Using both approaches, we find a positive, significant treatment effect on women’s empowerment outcomes. 
Instrumentation demonstrates that women who engage in income-generating projects are more empowered 
overall, in addition to being empowered in the following dimensions: economic decision-making, mobility, 
access to resources, and control over resources. These results are qualitatively similar to the PSM effects 
estimated, and suggests that our instrument adequately controls for sample selection.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Empirically, this is the first independent, 
econometric assessment of the relationship between income-generating projects and women’s 
empowerment in the context of rural Morocco. It is also the first to provide robust estimates of the impact 
of treatment. Methodologically, this paper is an attempt to challenge the notion that cross-sectional data 
from a non-randomized experimental framework cannot be used to make statements of inference on the 
impact of income-generating projects. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II lays out the motivating theoretical framework. 
Section III outlines the testing strategy. Section IV details the data used. Section V discusses the estimation 
results. Section VI concludes and offers policy implications.   
II. Motivating Theoretical Framework 
A. Economic Development and Women’s Empowerment  
The subject of defining empowerment has never been free of controversy or difficulty. Many scholars 
indicate that empowerment is a “latent phenomenon,” meaning that it is not directly observable (Narayan-
Parker, 2005). Its aggregate actions or results may be observed, but its internal dynamism is much more 
difficult to examine and evaluate. It also raises the need to address what it means to transition from 
disempowerment to empowerment.  Scholars have gone on to define women’s empowerment as improving 
the ability of women to access the constituents of development– in particular health, education, earning 
opportunities, rights, and political participation (Duflo, 2012). Gender empowerment has also been defined 
as the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such 
an ability (Kabeer, 1991). The ability to choose incorporates three inter-related dimensions: resources, 
agency, and achievements (Kabeer, 1999). This conceptualization of empowerment highlights the 
interdependence of individual and structural change in the processes of empowerment. Structures shape 
individual resources, agency, and achievements. Economic agendas set the structures that ultimately end up 
shaping the empowerment of individuals. The development priorities of nations are ultimately set by 
governments and the larger global community. Economic development, by in large, has been defined as a 
multi-dimensional process that involves changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national 
institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication 
of poverty (Todaro and Smith, 2011).  
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the prevailing development strategy, as part of the modernization model, 
regarded economic growth as the main development objective. Traditional economic development theories 
promote the idea that poverty is rooted primarily in deficient savings, and this, foreign aid should be able to 
remedy this ailment. However, most aid has been distributed in a top-down development approach system. 
Aid money passes through a complex system involving a chain of agencies, with resources being wasted at 
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each level. After some years, it become more apparent that the expected trickle-down effect from the 
investment projects to the majority of those at the base of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2009) did not occur. As 
the Green Revolution unfolded in the 1970s witness a surge in government-directed credit programs to rural 
programs. In 1980s, the development strategy of redistribution and basic human needs was replaced by the 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP).  The strategy of subsidized credit provision in rural areas was replaced 
by a more market-based approach, where the private sector took charge of credit provision.  
This gradually set the stage for microfinance to emerge as a tool of economic development and poverty 
alleviation. The presumption is that microfinance will significantly increase women’s incomes, enable them 
to play a more critical role in the decisions of their household. Randomized evaluations have been 
conducted to evaluate the impact of microfinance in developing nations, such as India, but no discernible 
changes in women’s empowerment outcomes were observed after both 18 and 36 months (Banerjee, Duflo, 
Glennerster, Kinnan, 2014). This defies the conventional image of the role of microfinance in the life of the 
poor. The literature has pointed to this result since 1996. Evidence from Bangladesh has also suggested that 
credit taken by women may be used by the male household head instead, with women having very little 
control over their own investments (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). This is in line with the phenomena that 
researchers have identified as the “feminization” of debt (Mayoux, 2001). In the absence of support 
networks and empowerment strategies, female credit targeting could merely shift the burden of household 
debt and subsistence onto women. This has serious implications not only for women themselves, but also 
for children and the role of men in the household and society.  
This prompts us to rethink the role of microfinance in economic development. In fact, there has been a 
dearth of literature assessing the underlying mechanism that explains how microfinance impacts 
entrepreneurial activity. This study attempts to address this deficiency in the literature. We explore the role 
that income-generating projects have in empowering women in rural Morocco. Income-generating projects 
are often initiatives adopted by small scale enterprises (SSEs). Small and informal firms have been found to 
be the source of employment for half or more of the labor force in most developing countries. As large-
scale enterprises become incapable of providing large shares of employment in developing countries, 
employment by SSEs becomes all the more important. Scholars suggest that the importance of small-scale 
enterprise in rural contexts increases as the size of locality decreases (Overholt, 1984). For women, SSEs 
offer opportunities to earn income without the restrictions that come with employment in larger enterprises, 
which may require education, training, and experience that women may not necessarily have.  
Two schools of thought exist on supporting active policies to promote women’s empowerment. The first 
suggests that women’s empowerment is valuable in and of itself, and worth the cost that it implies. The 
second rationale suggests that women have a fundamental role to play in development. It is thought that not 
only is it equitable to reduce the gender gap in education, political participation, and employment 
opportunities, but it is also beneficial in its ability to induce positive societal outcomes (Duflo, 2012). This 
would explain why many developmental efforts have specifically targeted women, in terms of microcredit 
schemes and conditional cash transfer programs. This is to suggest that women’s empowerment induces 
economic development. Economic development has a primary role to play in narrowing the gap between 
men and woman – an issue that hinders development itself (Sen, 1987). 
The literature approaches the role of women in development by first examining the role that they play in the 
household. An analysis of decision-making power within a household is necessary as households are often 
sites of distributional inequality. Scholars suggest that bargaining power comprises a wide range of factors, 
some of which are quantifiable, and others which are less so (Agrawal, 1997). Bargaining power models 
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allow for an analysis of the importance of gender in decision-making. Based on the intra-household 
bargaining literature (Browning and Chiappori, 1998, Duflo, 2003, Blumberg, 2005), economic factors are 
identified as an important factor for empowering women. Bargaining power can be measured by an 
individual’s resources: their labor and non-labor income, transfer payments, (paid) labor supply, and assets. 
Educational attainment may also be considered as a resource that contributes to bargaining power. Others 
consider the number of children a woman has to be a measure of a women’s bargaining power (Osmani, 
2007).  
 
There has also been a theoretical demonstration that income needs to only be generated by women, but also 
in their control, to impact their bargaining power in the household (Anderson and Eswaran, 2005). This is 
also supported by the finding that cash transfers that are made to women only do not automatically translate 
into an increase in their bargaining power (Kabeer 2005, Malhotra and Mather 1997). This arises from the 
cultural and social constraints imposed on women’s autonomy, or personal accumulation of resources. 
Increases in the value of female time and monetary time have been postulated to result in higher bargaining 
power, access to economic opportunities, and greater participation in household decision-making. This 
induces a greater investment in education, nutrition, and housing for children (Duflo, 2003). In the literature, 
it is assumed that by increasing the relative value of female time and her money income, the weight and 
hence the bargaining power of the female members can be increased within the household. This weight 
could be thought of as one index of women’s empowerment as it is reflective of a woman’s power within 
the household. 
 
B. Economic Conceptualization of Household Decision-Making 
Neoclassical models of intra-household distribution put forth the unitary household decision-making model, 
which assumes that family members act as if they maximize a single utility function. The consensus model 
was the first model to ignore intra-household differences in preferences (Samuelson, 1956). Later, a 
household model was developed in which the head of the household – the patriarch – aggregates the 
preferences of individuals to form one joint utility function and sets out to maximize it. Both theories ignore 
the potential for unequal power and resource distribution within households. There has been a move 
towards the methodological argument that suggests individuals, not households, have heterogeneous 
preferences and utility functions (Cherchye et al., 2005).  
Economists have transitioned to non-unitary models that conceptualize bargaining power models. These 
models are more commonly referred to as collective household models. They interpret the intra-household 
allocation of power as an outcome of bargaining processes among household members. Conceptualizations 
of asymmetric intra-household bargaining power theories appear in the literature in the 1980s (Manser and 
Brown 1980, and McElroy and Horney 1981).  
Within our theoretical framework, we utilize the collective household model to allow the representation of 
individual behavior within the household. In collective models, choices are derived by assuming Pareto-
optimality of allocations, and single a priori assumption defines the collective rationality concept used. If the 
behavior in the household is Pareto efficient, the household’s objective function takes the form of a 
weighted sum of individual utilities, as can be seen in (1):  
(1)                                                   Ω = θ u1(x) + (1 - θ) u2(x) 
	  	  
5 
where θ ε (0,1) stands for the relative power of the female compared to male partner in the household 
decision making process; u1(x) captures the preferences of the female over a bundle of consumption goods 
‘x’, and u2(x) are the male preferences over the same consumption bundle.  
 
Montgomery and Casterline (1996) argue that women face an optimization problem in which she chooses a 
course of action c in order to maximize her expected utility. Let {c1, …, cN} be the set which represents the 
universe of choices that a woman could potentially make. Let {c1, …, cK} be the set which represents the 
universe of choices that a woman is aware of as being available to her (K ≤ N). We assume that a woman 
arrives at her choices as a result of her household bargaining, leading to one of several possible outcomes 
(indexed by j). Each outcome is associated a woman’s empowerment, Yj. Let P(Yj |c, I) be the probability of 
the woman experiencing the vector of determinants Yj, which is conditional on the choice made by her, c, 
and her information set, I. The vector Yj represents the outcome of the woman’s household bargaining. 
Thus, this framework is fully compatible with the standard Nash bargaining framework.  
 
Consider a woman who chooses to start her own income-generating project through bargaining. This 
represents her choice, cj. This decision affects the amount of household income she is able to control, Yj, 
which is an outcome of her household bargain. The impact of the bargaining outcome on her individual 
utility, and ultimately her empowerment, is denoted by U (Yj).  
 
The woman’s expected utility maximization problem is denoted by (2): 
 
(2)                                                    
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐 ∈ (𝑐1,… , 𝑐𝑘)    𝑈 Yj!   P(Yj  |c, I) 
 
The woman’s information set is composed of the following in (3): 
 
(3)                                                                                         𝐼 = (𝑝! , 𝑞! ,𝐸 𝑝!!! ,𝐸 𝑞!!! ,𝐸   𝑌!!!|c , Σ!,𝑍) 
 
pt and qt are known current prices and quantities of goods and services consumed by the woman. We 
presume that future price and quantities are E(pt+1) and E(qt+1). The expected future vector of 
empowerment dimensions, E(Yt+1|c), have associated variances  Σ2. Z is the vector of remaining costs and 
constraints that are not captured by the model’s specification.  
 
By engaging in entrepreneurial activities, women improve their household bargaining position and increase 
expected lifetime outcomes. In the worst case scenario, a woman is not worse off than before. We can think 
of this engagement as adding a choice cK+1 where K+1 ≤ N, to the woman’s existing choice set. Although 
some women may not select the newly available choice cK+1, its addition could lead to an increase in P(Yn 
|cm, I), where cm is a choice that was available before the engagement and Yn is an improved outcome for 
the woman. This expands choice sets, changes expectations of empowerment outcomes, given the choices. 
Ultimately, this can improve the woman’s expected utility. 
 
C. Measurement of Variables  
Using the existing literature on the determinants of intra-household bargaining- and decision- making power, 
we formulate and formally test the following hypotheses about women’s empowerment in rural Morocco. 
Since empowerment is an unobservable latent variable, we use its observable characteristics as proxies for 
empowerment. We define five dimensions that we believe to be representative of an expansions of choice 
and control, to take actions which are critical in influencing their life outcomes. These dimensions are: (i) 
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economic decision-making, (ii) child decision-making, (iii) mobility, (iv) access to resources, and (v) control 
over resources. A number of items are allocated to each of these five measurements. The empowerment 
score of each woman is computed by summing the scores obtained in all items listed under the respective 
dimension. The aggregate empowerment score is computed by summing the scores obtained across all items 
of the five dimensions of empowerment. We choose these variables because they represent a diverse set of 
ways in which income-generating projects can potentially empower women.  
D. Previous Empirical Studies  
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first econometric assessment of the impact of income-generating 
projects on women’s empowerment. Although the study cannot sufficiently address the unobserved 
heterogeneity of treatment and control groups and the issue of endogeneity, statistical measures, informed 
by methods used in the literature to handle observational data, have been undertaken to address these 
shortcomings.  
III. Testing Strategy  
The “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland, 1986) is that, for each individual, we can observe 
only one of the potential outcomes, as each individual at a certain time with receive either treatment or 
control, and not both. The estimation of causal effects can thus be thought of as a missing data problem 
(Rubin, 1976a), where we are interested in predicting the unobserved potential outcomes. 
We do this through instrumental variables estimation and propensity score matching. It is important to note 
that the propensity score matching method is not meant to compete with the instrumental variable 
estimation method. In fact, both methods have been demonstrated to work best in combination (Carpenter, 
1977; Robins and Rotnitzky, 1995; Heckman et al., 1997; Rubin and Thomas, 2000; Glazerman et al., 2003; 
Abadie and Imbens, 2006). This is in line with the property of “double robustness,” as both methods can 
lead to more precise inference and offers protection against mismodeling.  
A. Estimation Strategy & Robustness  
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation  
The instrumental variable (IV) estimator is defined in (4):  
(4)                                                                                                                             𝛽𝐼𝑉 =    𝑍′𝑋 −1(𝑍′𝑌)	  
For an instrumental variable, an instrument, Z, to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: 
1. Instrument exogeneity: corr (𝑍𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) = 0  
2. Instrument relevance: corr (𝑍𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) ≠ 0  
We posit that there is an issue of selection on observables and endogeneity of treatment. This means that 
changes in treatment are not only associated with changes in the dependent variable, empowerment in this 
case, but also changes in the error u. We assume that those who are treated are those who would have been 
more likely to be empowered. OLS estimation would provide inconsistent estimates. This necessitates the 
need for a method that would generate only exogenous variation in treatment. An instrumental variable is an 
exogenous regressor.  
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In this case, we identify the age of the association that the treatment group is associated with. We assume 
that the longer an association has been around, the greater the likelihood of impacting the outcome 
indicators of a woman’s empowerment. It is important to note that using age of the association as an 
instrument encapsulates the assumption that each association’s marketing and outreach efforts are uniform 
across all associations. By extension, this means that informational inefficiencies are overcome, and that all 
the beneficiaries targeted are made aware of the productive economic opportunities that come with joining 
the association. We assume that all associations experience similar shocks, and thus, would have been 
impacted uniformly if an external event were to interfere with their outreach impact, as determined by their 
age. We test for strict exogeneity by adding the reduced form residuals to the second stage regression. We 
find that the instrument has no structural covariance with the error across all instrumental variable 
estimations conducted.  
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Estimation  
Propensity score matching, in terms of structure, is most similar to randomized controlled trials (RCTs). A 
propensity score is the probability of a unit being assigned to a particular treatment given the observed 
covariates. In our case, this would be the probability of a woman being treated, that is, to have engaged in 
an income-generating project. The propensity score is the conditional probability of treatment given the 
background variables, 
(5)                                                   𝑝 𝑥 = Pr 𝑇 = 1 𝑋 = 𝑥) 
Where T is the treatment indicator variable and X is the vector of covariates. Let Y(1) and Y(0) denote the 
outcome under treatment and control, respectively. We must make the following assumptions for the 
estimation of the propensity score:  
1. Conditional Independence: there exists a set of X observable covariates such that after controlling for 
these covariates, the potential outcomes are independent of treatment status 
(6)                                                         [Y(1), Y(0)] ⊥  T|X 
After controlling, the assignment of units to treatment is “as good as random.” This assumption is also 
known as selection on observables.  
2. Common Support: for each value of X, there is a positive probability of being both in the treatment and 
control group 
(7)                                                                                                                         0 < 𝑃(𝑇 = 1| X) < 1 
This assumption ensures that there is sufficient overlap in the characteristics of the treated and control units 
to find adequate matches. 
After these two assumptions have been fulfilled, the treatment assignment is said to be “strongly ignorable” 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The propensity score assists in the construction of matched sets with 
similarly distributed covariates, without requiring exact matches on all of the individual variables. It 
summarizes the covariates into one scalar: the probability of being treated. Propensity scores are balancing 
scores. This is to say that at each value of the propensity score, the distribution of the covariates defining 
the propensity score is the same in the treated and control groups.  
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This method matches treated units with their most similar controlled units, with respect to covariates – 
measuring the likelihood of having engaged with income-generating projects. This guarantees that the 
conditional probability of participation in the program is uniform across treated and controlled units. We 
employ a nearest neighbor algorithm to conduct 1:1 matching. For each treated individual i selects the 
control individual with the smallest distance from individual i.  
The propensity score matching estimator of T that matches on the estimated propensity scores in (8).  
(8)                                           𝑇!,!   !!   = !!! 𝑊!  (𝑌! − !! 𝑌!)!∈!!(!,!!)!!!!  
We define the average treatment effect (ATE) in (8). This is the effect of treatment on all individuals, in 
treatment and control. 
(9)                                                          𝐸[𝑌 1 − 𝑌 0 ] 
The propensity score matching estimator for the average treatment can be defined as 
(10)                                        𝑇∗! = !! (2𝑊! − 1)(𝑌! − !! 𝑌!)!∈!!(!)!!!!  
M is the number of matches per unit and Jm(i) is the set of matches for unit i. The matching is done on the 
true propensity score. We consider matching with replacement, so each unit in the sample can be matched 
multiple times. In the absence of matching ties, we define the set of match Jm(i) as:  
(11)   𝐽!(!) = 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁:  𝑊! = 1 −𝑊! , 1 𝑝 𝑋! − 𝑝 𝑋!!:!!!!!!! ≤ 𝑝 𝑋! − 𝑝 𝑋! ≤ 𝑀} 
We define the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) in (11).  This is the effect of treatment on 
those in the treatment group only.  
(12)                                                          𝐸 𝑌 1 − 𝑌 0   𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸   𝑌 1 𝐷 = 1)− 𝐸 𝑌 0 𝐷 = 1) 
The propensity score matching estimator for the average effect on the treated can be defined as 
(13)                                         𝑇∗! = !!! 𝑊!  (𝑌! − !! 𝑌!)!∈!!(!)!!!!  
We define N1 = 𝑊!!!!! , the number of treated units in the sample.  
IV. Data 
 
A. Sampling Framework 
Primary data was collected from 140 households in rural Morocco. The target population comprises all 
women engaged with income-generating projects around Marrakesh, the capital of the mid-southwestern 
economic region of Marrakech-Tensift-El Haouz. This area is situated in central Morocco.  
The author collaborated with Peace Corps Volunteers on the ground to reach the communities of interest. 
The author also worked with the High Atlas Foundation (HAF) a US 501(c)(3) organization and a 
Moroccan association, on contextualizing income-generating projects and women’s empowerment in rural 
Morocco. HAF takes on a participatory approach to development, and this is in line with the author’s 
approach.   
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The exact ratio of treatment to control observations is 1:1. 70 women were surveyed for treatment, while 70 
were also in control. Those belonging to the control group were women who had not yet began working on 
their income-generating projects, but were comparable to the treatment group in that they were enrolled in 
workshops that equipped with them necessary business skills to launch future entrepreneurial ventures. It 
was necessary to ensure that the control group was comparable in some sense to the treatment, as this 
would remedy selection bias. Those who engage in income-generating projects may be fundamentally 
different from those who don’t, in a variety of ways that are captured in the selection of covariates.  
 
B. Questionnaire Design  
The building block of empirical research is the questionnaire. It makes or breaks the enquiry at hand. The 
questionnaire design was guided by the research question, previous empirical studies, and the World Bank’s 
Living Standards and Measurement Survey (LSMS). In addition to the quantitative findings that the survey 
attempted to answer, qualitative questions were incorporated in the survey to reinforce the validity of 
findings. The questionnaire was translated into Arabic by the author, a native speaker of Arabic. However, 
the author often had to resort to local oral translators when the women at hand only spoke Berber. The 
draft instrument was pre-tested in the field, to optimize the length and type of questions to be asked in the 
questionnaire. The final questionnaire could be delivered in approximately 30-45 minutes. The sequences of 
the questions followed the best practices for household surveys where less sensitive questions preceded 
those that were more sensitive. 
 
C. Implementation 
 
The final instrument was implemented in a three week period in May 2013. The instrument underwent some 
changes for the control group. The survey was carried out by the author. Once the data collection was 
completed, the data was processed into the computer, to ensure quality control. 
 
V. Estimation Results & Discussion  
Table A reports the descriptive statistics of all the exogenous and endogenous variables used in the 
regression analysis. This offers a crude comparison of the treatment and control groups on the covariates 
controlled for in this study. We observe that the duration of marriage, on average, is double for those in the 
treatment in comparison to the control group.  We also observe that the wage work status of the treatment 
group has a larger proportion of women who have been in occupations with payment, as anticipated. We 
also find that those in the treatment group are more likely to live in a joint family setting.  
Table B summarizes the differences in means and standard deviations for each indicator of empowerment 
for both the treatment and control group. Most of the results are as we anticipate. On empowerment 
dimensions that are more economically-oriented, we observe the greatest disparities between treatment and 
control. In the area of child decision-making, women of both the treatment and control are similarly 
engaged. The same is to be said of mobility. This speaks, at a basic and naïve level, to the pervasive nature 
of patriarchy and distribution of control in society. Most women, even in the treatment group, continue to 
need permission from male figures in leaving the house, to go to the market, healthcare center, a relatives’ 
residence, the fair, or the next village.  
Table C summarizes the estimated effects of the impact of income-generating projects on dimensions of 
women’s empowerment, using IV and PSM estimation. We also report the percentage level conversions of 
these estimates. A comparison of estimates across methods highlights the robustness of our findings. We 
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compare 2SLS with the ATET results obtained from PSM as they are the two most similar and comparable 
in what they attempt to measure: the impact on those affected by the instrument, that is, the treated group. 
Overall, these results suggest that engaging in income-generating projects empowers women especially 
overall (total), and control over resources. In the rest of this section, we discuss the results of each 
estimation method in further detail.   
A. Instrumental Variables Results 
Table D tabulates the robust first stage results, demonstrating that the instrument utilized is highly 
significant and positively correlated with the treatment. This validates the use of the instrument to predict 
empowerment. The first stage regression also suggests that women who are members of a cooperative are 
more likely to participate in treatment. The F-statistic for the first-stage regression is used to determine 
whether the instrument is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable of interest. In our regression, 
the F-statistic is 22.274, greater than the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). 
No Sargan test is needed as the model is just identified.  
Table E and F report OLS results and the robust IV stage results, respectively. We offer OLS results to 
demonstrate the importance of instrumenting for treatment. The analysis suggests that those who participate 
in treatment are significantly more empowered in general than those who do not. This result is significant at 
the 0.1% level. Access to resources is also significant at the 0.1% level. Economic decision-making and 
control over resources are both significant at the 1% level. Mobility is significant at the 5% level.  
We also compute the Wu-Hausman test to examine the difference between the IV and OLS coefficients. 
The null hypothesis of this test suggests that there is no endogeneity. We reject the null hypothesis in the 
regressions of total empowerment, economic decision-making, mobility, access to resources, and control 
over resources. The Wu-Hausman test indicates the presence of endogeneity in these estimations, thereby 
validating our reliance on instrumental variable estimates rather than OLS. The Breusch-Pagan test, 
otherwise known as the Lagrange Multiplier test, tests for homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis of the 
Breusch-Pagan test indicates homoscedasticity. We only fail to reject the null in the regressions of total 
empowerment, access to resources, and control over resources. Despite this, robust Huber-White standard 
errors are computed to account for potential heteroscedasticity.  
Child decision-making is the only dimensions of empowerment that does not appear to be impacted 
significantly upon treatment. The age of the participant appears to be consistently significant across the 
regressions involving total empowerment, mobility, access to resources, and control over resources. The 
trend is generally that an older a woman is, the more likely she is to be empowered on those respective 
dimensions of empowerment. This poses an interesting tension, as for women who are married, we observe 
that the longer a woman has been married, the less likely she is to be empowered in general, mobile, and 
have control over resources. Interestingly, we also find that a divorced woman is more likely to be 
empowered in the dimensions of total empowerment, economic decision-making, child decision-making, 
mobility, access to resources, but not control over resources. This is a powerful finding as it speaks to the 
environment of patriarchy that women often escape upon escaping their marriages. We also find that the 
more children a woman has, the more likely she is to have say in matters of child decision-making, but not 
in other dimensions of empowerment. This raises the question of whether women participate in the 
perpetuation of traditional gender roles.  
B. Propensity Score Matching Results  
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Table G reports the propensity score estimations and odds ratio results using a logistic regression. An odds 
ratio of less than 1 typically means that the respective factors would have reduced the probability of 
treatment. We observe that the wage work status of unemployed, being married, having more children, and 
more adult males in the household drive the likelihood of treatment down. We observe a chi-square of 77.24 
with 18 degrees of freedom and an associated p-value of less than 0.001 suggests that the model is 
significant. The log likelihood is -58.42 on 19 degrees of freedom.  
Tables H and I provides the balance statistic for both before and after matching, respectively. We run a 
1000 bootstrap samples, and report the bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, to provide correct 
coverage even when there are point masses in the distributions being compared (Abadie, 2002). We also 
report the variance ratio (treatment/control). If this ratio is 1, then this suggests a perfect balance has 
achieved on the respective covariate. Overall, we find that the impact of matching achieves a better balance, 
as the variance ratio tends to 1 for most indicators. This allows to presume that any differences in measures 
of empowerment are likely to be driven by engaging in income-generating projects.  
Table J reports the average treatment effects and average treatment effect on the treated estimates, alongside 
the Abadie-Imbens standard errors. These standard errors provide correct coverage since the X vector 
contains the covariates and thus, takes into account the uncertainty of the matching procedure. We find that 
the average treatment effects are consistently positive across all dimensions of empowerment. The average 
treatment effect of engaging in income-generating projects on total empowerment is 3.99 points. This 
translates into a 21.03% increase in total empowerment. For the average treatment effect on the treated, we 
observe that the impact of treatment is a 14.21% increase on total empowerment. We observe lower average 
treatment effect on treated estimates consistently.   
C. Comparing IV & PSM Results  
The IV estimates are known as the “local” average treatment effect (LATE). This is the average causal effect 
for those affected by the instrument. The LATE is not informative about the impact of income-generating 
projects on those who are in the control group because, by definition, their treatment status is unaffected by 
the instrument. Thus, the LATE estimates obtained from IV cannot be compared directly to average 
treatment effects estimated by the propensity score model. Some efforts in the literature have attempted to 
multiply the LATE estimates with individual propensity scores for participation, to provide information on 
the distribution of treatment effects. The average of this interaction is said to be the average treatment effect. 
We proceed with a comparison of the IV estimates with the average treatment effects on the treated as 
those estimates are more comparable in what the structures they are attempting to capture. Table C offers a 
comparison of the estimates of these two methods. We find that the IV method is able to detect more 
significance than the PSM method is able to. The IV estimates suggests that total empowerment, economic 
decision-making, mobility, access to resources, and control over resources achieve significance. The PSM 
method suggests that only total empowerment and control over resources achieve significance. Such a result 
is counterintuitive as total empowerment is contingent on the other dimensions of empowerment that do 
not appear to achieve significance. PSM is known to require a large sample size in order to gain statistically 
reliable results, as PSM has a tendency to discard many observations which fall under the common support. 
There are variations in the magnitudes of estimates produced, but overall, we find that both methods 
produce estimates that are of the same direction. With that said, we rely on the IV estimates more heavily, as 
instrumenting is less sensitive to the requirements for a large sample size.  
	  	  
12 
VI. Conclusions & Policy Implications  
This paper uses primary data from rural Morocco to study the impact of income-generating projects on 
women’s empowerment. Traditional economic development theories promote top-down approaches to 
development. Such approaches have proven to be ineffective, as they tend to view the poor as part of the 
problem rather than as part of the solution. Bottom-up development strategies take into account local 
economic strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats while considering the social, cultural, and legal 
characteristics of contexts. Income-generating projects are economically sustainable activities undertaken by 
women in rural settings. Income-generating projects satisfy local needs and incorporate local women into 
decision-making processes that promote knowledge and grassroots innovations. By having greater say and 
bargaining power in their households and communities, women will be more empowered. Such an outcome 
will have significant benefits to the participant’s household and community. We find evidence that income-
generating projects succeed in empowering rural women. However, there is some variation across the five 
dimensions of empowerment identified.  
Our empirical approach addresses two sources of potential bias. First, endogeneity – that is essentially, an 
omitted, correlated variable bias issue – is address using the signature instrumental variables technique. 
Second, selection bias on observables – that is a difference in characteristics of women who are treated and 
untreated – is mitigated by propensity score matching. Within the constraints of cross section data, some 
meaningful robust estimates are made. We observe that there is a positive and significant impact on total 
empowerment by both the IV and PSM methods. IV and PSM methods estimate a 39.63% and 14.21% 
significant increase in total empowerment respectively. There is agreement between both methods that 
income-generating projects impact total empowerment and control over resources positively and 
significantly.  
Income-generating projects are not unique to Morocco, and may be fruitfully replicated elsewhere in the 
developing world, with the potential of yielding similarly positive results. With that said, we maintain that 
the relationship between income-generating projects and women’s empowerment demands further 
investigation, particularly through increasing the sample size, and asking more questions about the 
mechanisms that could potentially drive empowerment. It is also important to remember that the definition 
of empowerment continues to be re-evaluated by development practitioners and communities themselves. It 
could also be informative to compare these results with those of a randomized controlled trial (RCT), as that 
would provide some benchmark for the quasi-experimental methods utilized. Such knowledge would allow 
policymakers to reform and transform policy accordingly. This paper contributes to the academic and 
practitioner literature as it evaluates whether policies that encourage entrepreneurial activities should be 
subsidized, in an effort to improve gender empowerment outcomes.  
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Appendices 
Table A – Descriptive Statistics of Covariates  
Variable Name Definition 
Treatment Control 
Mean & t-statistics 
Treatment Dummy 0-1 Dummy Variable, =1 if 
respondent engaged with income-
generating projects; = 0 if she has 
not 
1.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Age of 
Respondent  
Reported age of respondent 
(continuous) 
38.6100 30.0430 
(-12.1680) (-11.1010) 
Schooling of 
Respondent 
Level of education achieved by 
respondent; =1 if elementary, =2 if 
middle, =3 if high school, =4 
university, =5 technical school 
1.343 1.343 
(-1.295) (-1.350) 
Wage Work Status Employment status of respondent; 
=0 if unemployed, =1 if currently 
employed, =2 if previously 
employed  
0.1570 0.3430 
(-0.4040) (-0.5870) 
Marital Status Marital Status of respondent; =0 if 
single, =1 if married, =2 if 
divorced, =3 if widowed, =4 in 2nd 
marriage  
0.8710 0.7570 
(-1.0760) (-1.0690) 
Duration of 
Marriage 
Number of years respondent has 
been in wedlock (continuous)  
12.0700 6.8140 
(-13.3620) (-9.7760) 
Surviving Children Number of total children of 
respondents (continuous) 
1.8430 1.4000 
(-2.1030) -1.9520 
Proportion of 
Adult Males 
Number of male members in the 
household above the age of 16 
(continuous)  
0.6140 0.6140 
(-0.9670) (-0.9220) 
Joint Family Co-residence with in-laws; =0 if 
not, =1 if yes 
0.0290 0.0140 
(-0.1680) (-0.1200) 
Age of Association  The number of years the 
association has been serving its 
beneficiaries (continuous) 
3.5000 2.4460 
(-1.9880) (-1.5970) 
Number of 
Observations 140 70 70 
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Table B – Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Indicators  
Dependent Variable Treatment Control Mean & t-statistics 
Economic Decision-Making 2.2000 1.4430 
(-1.1370) (-1.2580) 
Food Purchases  0.7000 0.4570 
(-0.4920) (-0.5020) 
Major Household Goods 0.6570 0.4140 
(-0.5080) (-0.4960) 
Personal Belongings 0.8430 0.5710 
(-0.4040) (-0.4980) 
Child Decision-Making 1.3860 1.1140 
(-1.3760) (-1.3460) 
Child Sickness 0.4860 0.4140 
(-0.5030) (-0.4960) 
Child Education 0.3570 0.2710 
(-0.4830) -0.4480 
Child Discipline 0.5430 0.4290 
(-0.5020) (-0.4980) 
Mobility 2.8290 2.3860 
(-2.0850) -2.0660 
Market 0.6000 0.5000 
(-0.4930) (-0.5040) 
Healthcare Centre  0.5570 0.5000 
(-0.5000) (-0.5040) 
Relatives’ Residence 0.7570 0.7140 
(-0.4320) (-0.4550) 
Fair 0.4860 0.3430 
(-0.5030) (-0.4780) 
Next Village  0.4290 0.3290 
(-0.4980) (-0.4730) 
Access to Resources 2.9140 2.0290 
(-1.3910) (-1.6330) 
Household Expenditure  0.7430 0.5570 
(-0.4400) (-0.5000) 
Cash to Spend  0.8290 0.7140 
(-0.3800) (-0.4550) 
Purchase of Personal Belongings 0.7140 0.4000 
(-0.4550) (-0.4930) 
Purchase of Gifts for Relatives 0.6290 0.3570 
(-0.4870) (-0.4830) 
Control over Resources 1.1710 0.5140 
(-0.8840) (-0.8120) 
Owns household goods 0.6430 0.3140 
(-0.4830) (-0.4680) 
Savings for future 0.5290 0.2000 
(-0.5030) (-0.4030) 
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Table C –Triangulation of Estimation Methods  
Method 
 
Total Economic DM Child DM Mobility 
Access to 
Resources 
Control 
over 
Resources 
IV  
7.5332*** 1.4211** 0.3126 1.8061* 2.5662*** 1.4271*** 
(2.3047) (0.5162) (0.3896) (1.0828) (0.6454) (0.4197) 
% 39.65 23.67 6.25 36.12 64.16 71.36 
PSM 
2.7000. 0.4857 -0.1857 0.5714 0.9286 0.9000*** 
(1.5380) (0.3577) (0.3547) (0.6237) (0.4780) (0.2462) 
% 14.21 8.10 -3.71 11.43 23.22 45.00 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses for IV 
estimates. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are in parentheses for PSM ATET estimates.  
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Table D – Robust First Stage (Reduced) Regression Results  
 Treatment 
(Intercept) -0.5843*** 
 (0.1333) 
Age of Association 0.1034*** 
 (0.0218) 
Ed: Elementary 0.2241* 
 (0.1038) 
Ed: Middle School 0.150164 
 (0.1177) 
Ed: High School 0.165019 
 (0.1590) 
Ed: Undergraduate School 0.10622 
 (0.1154) 
Ed: Graduate School -0.2645 
 (0.1946) 
Ed: Technical School 0.6719. 
 (0.1320) 
Employment Status: Yes -0.091667 
 (0.1216) 
Employment Status: No 0.1530 
 (0.1262) 
Duration of Marriage 0.012 
 (0.0077) 
Married -0.0113 
 (0.1263) 
Divorced 0.188872 
 (0.2222) 
Widowed 0.181457 
 (0.1975) 
Second Marriage 0.123399 
 (0.1475) 
Age -0.001879 
 (0.0057) 
Surviving Children -0.041236 
 (0.0414) 
Adult Males in HH -0.026315 
 (0.0627) 
Co-residence with in-laws 0.101056 
 (0.2340) 
Cooperative 0.8518*** 
 (0.0944) 
First Stage F-statistic 22.2740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4303 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table E – OLS Regression Results  
 Total Economic  Child  Mobility Access Res Control Res 
(Intercept) -1.8438 -0.0600 0.0651 -1.1922. -0.2049 -0.4517 
 (1.6111) (0.3865) (0.3108) (0.67481) (0.5247) (0.3124) 
Treatment 0.7614 0.1424 0.0225 -0.3089 0.3836 0.5218** 
 (0.8538) (0.2048) (0.1647) (0.3576) (0.2780) (0.1656) 
Ed: Elementary -0.5969 -0.0932 -0.1022 0.0496 -0.2461 -0.2050 
 (1.0044) (0.2409) (0.1938) (0.4207) (0.3271) (0.1948) 
Ed: Middle School -0.5850 0.0784 -0.1964 -0.1139 -0.2604 -0.0928 
 (1.0621) (0.2548) (0.2049) (0.4449) (0.3459) (0.2059) 
Ed: High School 1.9956 0.4520 -0.0246 0.7890 0.5679 0.2113 
 (1.3928) (0.3341) (0.2687) (0.5833) (0.4536) (0.2701) 
Ed: Undergraduate School 1.7477 0.3506 -0.1152 1.2257 0.2805 0.0062 
 (1.7733) (0.4254) (0.3421) (0.7427) (0.5780) (0.3438) 
Ed: Graduate School 0.9788 -0.3574 1.1510* 0.0584 0.2911 -0.1643 
 (2.5211) (0.6048) (0.4864) (1.0559) (0.8210) (0.4888) 
Ed: Technical School 2.5112 0.5840 -0.4642 1.3972 0.6969 0.2973 
 (4.0766) (0.9779) (0.7865) (1.7074) (1.3276) (0.7905) 
Employment Status: Yes 4.6248*** 0.9310*** 0.3197. 1.5727*** 0.9936** 0.8079*** 
 (0.9892) (0.2373) (0.1908) (0.4143) (0.3221) (0.1918) 
Employment Status: No 4.00716. 0.992985. 0.2713 1.0609 1.1181 0.5639 
 (2.2035) (0.5286) (0.4251) (0.9230) (0.7176) (0.4273) 
Duration of Marriage -0.0581 0.0116 0.0242 -0.0681* -0.0077 -0.0182 
 (0.0778) (0.0187) (0.0150) (0.0326) (0.0253) (0.0151) 
Married 2.22256. 0.4327 1.1106*** 0.0681 0.6078 0.0034 
 (1.2303) (0.2951) (0.2374) (0.5153) (0.4007) (0.2386) 
Divorced 8.6751 2.0884** 1.5567** 2.9104* 1.4112 0.7084 
 (2.9488) (0.7074) (0.5689) (1.2351) (0.9603) (0.5718) 
Widowed 3.4072 0.4353 1.1528* 0.2499 1.0986 0.4706 
 (2.3460) (0.5628) (0.4526) (0.9826) (0.7640) (0.4549) 
Second Marriage 3.1765* 0.3894 0.9168** 1.1169. 0.8398 -0.0863 
 (1.5574) (0.3736) (0.3005) (0.6523) (0.5072) (0.3020) 
Age 0.1746*** 0.0031 -0.0031 0.0900*** 0.0555** 0.0291** 
 (0.0514) (0.0123) (0.0100) (0.0215) (0.0168) (0.0100) 
Surviving Children -0.0631 -0.0277 0.1887* 0.0525 -0.2941* 0.0175 
 (0.4196) (0.1006) (0.0809) (0.1757) (0.1366) (0.0814) 
Adult Males in HH 0.5768 0.0742 -0.0046 0.1522 0.2562 0.0987 
 (0.5739) (0.1376) (0.1107) (0.2404) (0.1869) (0.1113) 
Co-residence with in-laws 1.5953 1.1013 0.9999* -1.6506 0.7135 0.4312 
 (2.4031) (0.5765) (0.4636) (1.0065) (0.7826) (0.4660) 
Cooperative  2.8833* 1.3129*** 0.1467 0.9209. 0.5227 -0.0199 
 (1.3007) (0.3120) (0.2509) (0.5448) (0.4236) (0.2522) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5352 0.4554 0.7019 0.3968 0.3641 0.3212 
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table F – Robust IV Regression Results  
 Total  Economic Child Mobility Access Res Control Res 
(Intercept) 0.8783 0.4540 0.1818 -0.34204 0.6724 -0.0877 
 (1.8211) (0.3831) (0.3393) (0.7704) (0.5611) (0.3333) 
Treatment 7.5332*** 1.4211** 0.3126 1.8061* 2.5662*** 1.4271*** 
 (2.3047) (0.5162) (0.3896) (1.0828) (0.6454) (0.4197) 
Ed: Elementary -2.7631* -0.502191. -0.1950 -0.6270 -0.94427* -0.49461* 
 (1.2420) (0.2886) (0.2458) (0.5532) (0.3493) (0.2095) 
Ed: Middle School -2.3032* -0.2460 -0.2700 -0.6506 -0.8142* -0.3225 
 (1.2640) (0.2726) (0.2082) (0.5871) (0.3999) (0.2375) 
Ed: High School 0.1448 0.1025 -0.1039 0.2109 -0.0286 -0.0361 
 (1.5525) (0.3249) (0.2957) (0.6773) (0.4817) (0.2907) 
Ed: Undergraduate School -0.2613 -0.0288 -0.2013 0.5982 -0.3670 -0.2624 
 (1.6131) (0.3928) (0.3083) (0.8493) (0.6023) (0.2907) 
Ed: Graduate School 1.7302 -0.2155 1.1832* 0.2931 0.5333 -0.0638 
 (3.1711) (0.5613) (0.8602) (1.1115) (0.5104) (0.4784) 
Ed: Technical School -2.6245 -0.3857 -0.6843 -0.2068 -0.9584 -0.3893 
 (2.0069) (0.4543) (0.3260) (0.9346) (0.5842) (0.3768) 
Employment Status: Yes 6.1606*** 1.2210*** 0.38546. 2.0524*** 1.4886*** 1.0133*** 
 (0.9968) (0.2265) (0.2314) (0.3953) (0.3126) (0.2281) 
Employment Status: No 3.2370 0.8476 0.2383 0.8204 0.8698 0.4609 
 (1.7732) (0.5426) (0.5206) (0.9308) (0.6125) (0.3385) 
Duration of Marriage -0.1620* -0.0080 0.0198 -0.1005** -0.0412 -0.0321* 
 (0.0800) (0.0201) (0.0189) (0.0421) (0.0228) (0.0176) 
Married 3.0013* 0.5797* 1.1440*** 0.3113 0.8588* 0.1075 
 (1.2278) (0.2744) (0.3086) (0.5932) (0.4240) (0.2202) 
Divorced 9.7271*** 2.2870** 1.6018** 3.2390** 1.7502. 0.8490 
 (2.1523) (1.1134) (0.4913) (0.9118) (0.6097) (0.4290) 
Widowed 2.0153 0.1724 1.09314* -0.1848 0.6500 0.2845 
 (1.9890) (0.4492) (0.6169) (1.0618) (0.7954) (0.3321) 
Second Marriage 2.8300. 0.3240 0.9019** 1.0086 0.7282 -0.1327 
 (1.3784) (0.2983) (0.4216) (0.6273) (0.3582) (0.3379) 
Age 0.1357** -0.0042 -0.0048 0.0779*** 0.0429** 0.0239* 
 (0.0576) (0.0144) (0.0092) (0.0223) (0.0184) (0.0110) 
Surviving Children 0.3247 0.0455 0.2054* 0.1736 -0.1691 0.0694 
 (0.4193) (0.1009) (0.1048) (0.2200) (0.1423) (0.0938) 
Adult Males in HH 0.9264. 0.1402 0.0104 0.2614 0.3689* 0.1455 
 (0.5915) (0.1355) (0.1209) (0.2636) (0.1960) (0.1179) 
Co-residence with in-laws 0.8265 0.956129. 0.9670* -1.8907. 0.4657 0.3284 
 (1.1781) (0.2869) (0.2585) (0.5282) (0.5231) (0.4674) 
Cooperative  -1.8835 0.4128 -0.0576 -0.5679 -1.0136. -0.6572. 
 (1.6565) (0.4442) (0.3336) (0.8098) (0.5044) (0.3120) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5793 0.4874 0.7033 0.4131 0.4247 0.3308 
p-value Wu-Hausman  0.0000 0.0070 0.4500 0.0100 0.0010 0.0180 
p-value Breush-Pagan  0.4895 0.0178 0.0047 0.0758 0.4965 0.1626 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table G – Propensity Score Estimation and Odds Ratio Results   
                        Estimate Odds Ratio 
(Intercept) -35.20 0.0000 
  (2466)  
Ed: Elementary 1.781** 5.9352 
 (0.6672)  
Ed: Middle School 1.1120 3.0398   
 (0.6764)  
Ed: High School 1.369 3.9330 
 (0.8245)  
Ed: Undergraduate School 1.3440 3.8359         
 (1.3740)  
Ed: Graduate School  -17.73 0.0000 
 (5544)  
Ed: Technical School 20.70 979688500     
 (10750)  
Employment Status: Yes -0.8973  0.4077 
  (0.6146)  
Employment Status: No 15.61 6010603     
 (2359)  
Duration of Marriage 0.1167* 1.1238       
 (0.05926)  
Married  -0.7496 0.4726         
 (0.9111)  
Divorced   15.62 6074599 
 (5804)  
Widowed 17.22 29972330   
 (1984)  
Second Marriage 0.2407 1.2721     
 (1.2090)  
Age 0.01950 1.0197    
 (0.0336)  
Surviving Children  -0.4179 0.6584  
 (0.3059)  
Adult Males in HH  -0.2514 0.7777         
 (0.3674)  
Co-residence with in-laws 0.5290 1.6972    
 (1.3890)  
Cooperative  34.4000 8.6864 
 (2466)  
p-value for chi-squared test 0.0000000026 
-58.41835  log likelihood ratio test 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses.
	  	  
23 
Table H – Balance Statistics Before 1:1 Matching  
 
mean 
treatment mean control std mean diff 
var ratio 
(Tr/Cr) 
T-test p-
value 
Ed: Elementary 0.3000 0.3143 -3.0951 0.9744 0.8559 
Ed: Middle School 0.2000 0.2286 -7.0917 0.9074 0.6830 
Ed: High School 0.1286 0.0429 25.4240 2.7313 0.0714 
Ed: Undergraduate School 0.0429 0.0571 -7.0029 0.7614 0.7007 
Ed: Graduate School 0.0000 0.0429 - 0.0000 0.0832 
Ed: Technical School 0.0143 0.0000 11.9520 - 0.3208 
Employment Status: Yes 0.1286 0.2286 -29.6610 0.6354 0.1243 
Employment Status: No 0.0143 0.0571 -35.8570 0.2614 0.1751 
Duration of Marriage 12.0710 6.8143 39.3450 1.8680 0.0089 
Married 0.4286 0.4286 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Divorced 0.0429 0.0000 21.0090 - 0.0832 
Widowed 0.0429 0.0143 14.0060 2.9130 0.3142 
Second Marriage 0.0571 0.0714 -6.1105 0.8123 0.7327 
Age 38.6140 30.0430 70.4410 1.2015 0.0000 
Surviving Children 1.8429 1.4000 21.0550 1.1616 0.1988 
Adult Males in HH 0.6143 0.6143 0.0000 1.1024 1.0000 
Co-residence with in-laws 0.0286 0.0143 8.5135 1.9710 0.5629 
Cooperative 1.0000 0.6143 - 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table I – Balance Statistics After 1:1 Matching  
 
mean 
treatment mean control std mean diff 
var ratio 
(Tr/Cr) 
T-test p-
value 
Ed: Elementary 0.3000 0.4143 -24.7600 0.8654 0.1288 
Ed: Middle School 0.2000 0.2571 -14.1830 0.8376 0.4660 
Ed: High School 0.1286 0.0714 16.9490 1.6892 0.2050 
Ed: Undergraduate School 0.0429 0.0000 21.0090 - 0.0811 
Ed: Graduate School 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 1.0000 
Ed: Technical School 0.0143 0.0000 11.9520 - 0.3174 
Employment Status: Yes 0.1286 0.0857 12.7120 1.4297 0.3661 
Employment Status: No 0.0143 0.0000 11.9520 - 0.3174 
Duration of Marriage 12.0710 14.4140 -17.5340 0.7460 0.2263 
Married 0.4286 0.5429 -22.9280 0.9868 0.1933 
Divorced 0.0429 0.0000 21.0090 - 0.0811 
Widowed 0.0429 0.0000 21.0090 - 0.0811 
Second Marriage 0.0571 0.0429 6.1105 1.3134 0.7063 
Age 38.6140 37.4000 9.9791 0.7951 0.5124 
Surviving Children 1.8429 2.4286 -27.8460 0.7610 0.0620 
Adult Males in HH 0.6143 1.0143 -41.3440 0.8389 0.0124 
Co-residence with inlaws 0.0286 0.0286 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Cooperative 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 - 1.0000 
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Table J – Average Treatment Effect (ATE) & Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) Estimates  
 ATE ATET 
Total 3.9964* 2.7000. 
 (1.7917) (1.5380) 
Economic Decision-Making 0.7786* 0.4857 
 (0.3822) (0.3577) 
Child Decision-Making 0.4714 -0.1857 
 (0.4161) (0.3547) 
Mobility 0.7250 0.5714 
 (0.6764) (0.6237) 
Access to Resources 1.0679* 0.9286 
 (0.4702) (0.4780) 
Control over Resources 0.9536*** 0.9000*** 
 (0.2502) (0.2462) 
.p<0.10, * p<0.005, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
